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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
P. E. ASHTON COMPANY,
P"laintif f,
vs.
RUSSELL J. JOYNER,
Defendant and Third Party
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
UNITED PACIFIC
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Third Party Defendant
and Respondent.

Case No.

10254

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ·
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is 1an action by the Third Party Plaintiff
against the Third Party Defendant, Insurance Company, to create a new and entirely different insurance policy than the one for which the Third Party
Plaintiff paid a premium.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court entered judgment in favor of
the Third Pm·ty Defendant and against the Third
Party Plaintiff. In particular the trial court found
that by the terms of the insurance policy, insurance
coverage was not found to exist when the vehicle in
question was being operated by a person other than
1

Rosalie Joyner under the age of twenty-five years.
And second, the tri1a l court found the Third
Party Defendant. did not waive it's right to assert
the defense of non-coverage and was not barred by
the doctrine of estoppel to 1assert this defense.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent wants the judgment of the
lower court affirmed.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FA:CTS
The appellant's Statement of Facts is not complete, and it is 1also incorrect in some detail. Policy
No. ACR 65992 issued by the United Pacific Insurance Company to the Th'ird Party Plaintiff, in effect
from November 18, 1961 to November 18, 1962 affords coverage for Bodily Injury Liability, Coverage A; Property Damage Liability, Coverage B;
Automobile Medical Payments, Coverage C; Comprehensive Coverage, Coverage E; and Collision Coverage, $100 deductible, Coverage F (R '21). No coverage was afforded under Coverage D for Fire and
Theft, and no separate premium was paid for this
item (R 21). Coverage E, 'the Comprehensive Coverage, is the coverage most favorable to the Third
Party Plaintiff and Appellant. The respondent concedes that except for Endorsement 1, coverage would
have been afforded to the Third Party Plaintiff and
Appellant under Coverage E.
Endorsement No. 1 reads as follows:
"'Driver Exclusion - It is agreed that no insurance is afforded the named insured, any
2

other in~ured, person, organization, firm or
corporat10n by or under any provision of the
policy or of any endorsement attached thereto 01· iss1:1ed to form a part thereof while any
automobile covered by the policy is being operated, maintained or used by or under the control of any driver under the age of twentyfive (25), other than Rosalie Joyner."
The appellant in his Brief, Page 4, concedes
that at the time the loss in question occurred, the
vehicle insured was being operated by one Jimmy
Joyner, age 13 years.
The respondent did not negotiate with the P. E.
Ashton Company relative to the repair of the appellant's vehicle. Neal Kershner, the body shop foreman for the plaintiff, (Tr. 10) testified that in the
latter part of 1962 he had a conversation with Mr.
Joyner with respect to repairs of the 1958 Dodge
Truck ('Tr. 10) . He said at tha:t time the truck
was in their yard and tha:t relative to repairing it
he talked to a Mr. Green. He knew at that time Mr.
Green was an adjuster for the Independent Auto
Damage Appraisers of Salt Lake City. Further, Mr.
Kershner said (Tr. 19) that he never talked to Mr.
Kind, the adjuster, until after the vehicle of the
Third Party Plaintiff was repaired. Further, Mr.
Kershner said at the time he repaired the car (Tr.
19) that they did not talk to anyone but claims the
estimate was alright and that he could proceed to
l'epair the automobile of Mr. Joyner. And in particular, (Tr. 19) Mr. Kershner said that he understood in talking to Mr. Green the estimate was okay
3

as far as the adj us tor was concerned; not the Insurance Company. Mr. Kershner (R 25) testified
that the first conversation with Mr. Kind relative
to the repair of the vehicle was in June or July of
the year following the repair of the vehicle or 1963.
Mr. Kershner said that he had no conversation with
Mr. Kind or anyone else authorizing him to go ahead
with repairs on the vehicle, (Tr. 26). Further, although it is not admitted that Mr. Bowen, the agent
for Insur1aince Incorporated, had any authority to
make adjustments, Mr. Kershner testified that Mr.
Bowen did not tell him to repair the vehicle either.
On cross-examination (Tr. 28) Mr. Kershner testified that he knew from his own custom and practice in· the insurance industry that insurance companies don't authorize repairs of vehicles ('Tr. 28).
Mr. Kershner, (R 29) testified that the authori:?!ation to repair the vehicle had to come from the
owner.
Mr. Joyner, Third Party Plaintiff, (Tr. 40)
admitted that wh'en Mr. Kind contacted him about
the damage to the vehicle that Mr. Kind said the
Insurance Company was definitely no't going to pay
the claim (Tr. 40).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY HELD THE
APPELLANT WAS NOT INSURED AGAINST THE
LOSS.

Endorsement No. 1 was attached to the policy
at the time it was issued. Under Policy No. ACR
65992, it was agreed no insurance was afforded to
4

the appellant, the named insured, any other insured,
person, organization, firm or corporation by or under any provision of the policy, or endorsement at,atched thereto or issued to form a part thereof for
any automobile covered by the policy was being
operated, maintained or used by, or under the control
of any driver under the age of twenty-five, other
than Rosalie Joyner.
There is no ambiguity in the insurance policy
and respondent contends that to a person of ordinary
intelligence and unders'taJnding, the wording of the
endorsement was clear and certain and that in the
usual and natural meaning, the endorsement e~
cl uded all coverage to the named insured while
Russell Joyner, a thirteen-year old, was operating
the vehicle.
It has long been the practice of the insurance industry for insurance companies to protect themselves against the carelessness and hazards involved
of underaged drivers.
In 7 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice,
Sec. 440-1, it is stated:
"A provision 'that the ~ns~rer. shall .not be
liable when the automobile is bemg driven by
a person under the sp~ified age is v'.llid and
binding upon the parties~ and operat10n by a
person below. ~~at age .is not covered. The
le()"al responsibility of his parents would not
ch~ange the rule. Nor would the result depend
on the qiwstion of whether or not the owner
knowin_qly permitted such a person to operate." (Emphasis added.)
5

In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company vs. Coughran ( 19'27) 303 U.S. 485, 82
L. E'd. 970, the Supreme Court of the United States
declared where the policy excluded coverage from
the vehicle that was being operated by a driver
undera ge, and where at the time of the accident a
thirteen-year-old was operating a car, that a provision excluding coverage was enforceable, and reversed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and directed a judgment be entered in favor of the Insurance Company of "No Cause of Action."
In Mitzner vs. Fidelity & Casi1;alty Company
(1927) 154 N.E. 881, 94 Ind. App. 362, where the
policy excluded coverage where a vehicle was operated by one under the age of sixteen, and where admittedly the driver in the case was under the age
of sixteen, the court said in holding in favor of the
Insurance Company:
"There is no doubt or ambiguity about the
above clause; it is not open to construction;
it is a part of the coverage of said policy, and
as said automobile was, at the time of said
accident, being driven by a person under the
age of sixteen years, said policy did not afford such operation of said automobile; it
was without the coverage of said policy; and
there was no duty upon the insurance company to defend said damage suit nor is there
any liability for the expenses thereof."
In Hossley vs. Union Indemnity Company of
New York, (1925) 102 So. 561, 137 Miss. 537, where
the policy provided that it should not cover an auto1

6

mobile driven by a person in violation of law as to
age, or if there was no age limit, by a person under
sixteen years, the court held the insurer w:as not
liable for injuries resulting proximately by the automobile being driven by a person under sixteen years
of age regardless of whether or not the owner agreed
for such person to drive the car.
In Helm vs. Inter-Insurance Exchange (1945)
354 Mo. 935, 192 S.W. 2d 417, 167 A.L.R. 238,
where the driver was fifteen years old at the time
of the accident and where the policy excluded coverage if a driver was under the age of sixteen, the
coutt held there was no liability and no coverage
was afforded under the terms of the policy.
In 6 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law

& Practice, Section 3949, Blashfield states that ex-

press exemptions or exclusions from liability arising
where the automobile was being opel'!ated by a person in violation as to the age of the driver are not
repugnant to the statute provisions and are not void
as against public policy.

United Pacific Insurance Company knows of no
statute or ease in this state ruling such an exclusion
to be invalid or void as against public policy.
In case of dou:bt or ambiguity, it is correct to
construe the insurance policy in favor of the insured and against the insuror. In this case, however,
we have no ambiguity or doubt as to the meaning
of Endorsement No. 1. The Insurance Company is
7

entitled to have the terms of their policy interpreted
in their ordinary and popular sense.
In State Farm Jlifutu.al Autom<'bile Insurance
Company vs. Shaffer (1959) 250 N.C. 45 108 S.E.
2d 49, the general rule as to interpretation with regard to a problem of this type was stated:
"The interpretation of provisions of a liability
policy in light of facts found is a ma;tter of law
for the court, and in construing the policy, it
unambiguous terms are to be taken in their
plain, ordinary and popular sense."
In Utah, in Auto Lease Company vs. Central
Muti~al Insurance Company (1958) 7 U. 2d 336,
325 P. 2d 264, our court said that the rule that in
case of uncertainty or ambiguity of the insurance
policy should be construed most strongly against
insuror because it drew and issued the policy, but
unless there is some genuine ambiguity or uncertainty in the language upon which reasonable minds
may differ as to the meaning, and that the requirement was not satisfied merely because a party may
get a different meaning by placing a forced or
strained construction, and that the test to be applied
was:
"That the meaning be plain to a person of
ordinary intelligence and understandin~,
viewing the matter fairly and reasonably, m
accordance with the usual and natural meaning of the words, and in light of existing circumstances, including the purpose of ~he
policy. If so, the special rule of construct10n
is obviously unnecessary."
1

United Pacific Insurance Company submits that
under Endorsement No. 1 excluding coverage to the
named insured, the appellant, there is no coverage
afforded for the vehicle in question when being operated by Jimmy Joyner, age thirteen, and the endorsement excluded coverage to Mr. Joyner if the
vehicle was being operated by someone under the
age of twenty-five other than Rosalie Joyner. The
meaning of the policy is clear ,and certain and not
ambiguous.
Since the Insurance Company knew that Jimmy
Joyner had been operating the vehicle since he was
eleven years of age at the time the endorsement ( 1)
was attached to the pollcy, it is difficult if not impossible to believe the father, the appellrant, did not
know as much. However, it is submitted in view of
the wording of Endorsement No. 1 that it was not
material as to whether or not the father admittedly
knew of the operation of the vehicle by Jimmy
Joyner.
The pertinent question is whether or not Jimmy Joyner was under the age of twenty-five, and
this is admitted.
The purpose of exclusionary endorsement is
to prohibit insureds from permitting inexperienced
operators to use the vehicle. The owner has control
over the use of the car. Either by proper training
of his family or by proper locking of the car and
retention and custody of the keys, use can be re9

stricted. Only the owner can restrict the use not
'
the Insurance Company.
The only case the appellant cites which even
remotely support appellant's contention, is the case
of Aetna Casualty and Surety Company VS. Habib
Etoch, 174 Ark. 409, 295 S.W. 2d 376. This is a
case tha:t holds that where the driver of vehicle left
it in charge of an eleven year old boy while he was
in a barber shop, the vehicle nevertheless was in the
control of the person in the barber shop and not in
control of the eleven year old boy who endeavored
to operate it.
Applying this 1analogy to our particular case,
we would have to find that at the time of the loss,
Mr. Joyner was in control of the vehicle when in
fact, he did not know about the loss until some days
later and was, in fact, on a plane to Washington
D.C. some hundreds of miles from the scene of the
accident. In the Aetna Casualty & Surety Company
vs. Habib Etoch case, supra, the court went a long
way to hold the Insurance Company liable. In this
case, the appellant wan ts the court to go a good many
miles further in an effort to reach the deep pocket
of the Insurance Company.
POINT II
THE COURT CORRECTLY FOUND NO ACCORD
BETWEEN THE APPELLANT AND THE RESPONDENT.

An Accord and Satisfaction is an agreement
between two parties to give and accept something
10

in satisfaction of a right of action which one has
against the other, which when performed, is 'a bar
to all actions upon the account. To be effective an
'
accord must be complete.
The record shows that P. E. Ashton Company,
acting through it's Body Shop Foreman, started in on
the repairs of the truck at the direction of the appellant, and not the respondent, and that Mr. Keshner
knew it was not the policy nor practice of the Insurance Company to authorize repairs on vehicles
damaged. Further, it would appear that if there is
still a dispute in existence as to whether or rrot the
appellant was making his claim under the comprehensive or collision coverage, no accord or agreement was reached, and in any event, the appellant
admits he did not accept the offer of the respondent,
because he wanted to make a larger claim under the
comprehensive coverage and that the respondent
merely offered to pay appellant under the collision
coverage.
As a practical matter, the adjuster, Mr. Kind,
forgot a!bout the exclusionary endorsement, excluding all coverage to Mr. Joyner when the vehicle was
being operated by a person under the age of twentyfive other than Rosalie Joyner and mistakenly mailed out a Collision Release. The mistake caused no
damage and was discovered before any payment
was made.
Although in this appeal and at the various
hearings (R 46) the appellant argues that by hav11

ing made the offer to pay under the collision coverage, the respondent waived it's defense of non-coverage; that an accord was reached; and that it was
stopped from denying liability on this basis. However, the trial court, in accordance with Keck vs.
American Fire Insurance Company (1942) 237 Mo.
App. 308, 167 S.W. 2d 644, held that a waiver does
not create a new cause of aetion where none is existent, and that ordinarily a waiver is applied for
the purpose of defeating a forfeiture, and even if a
substantial right is claimed as a waiver, there must
be some consideration for it. Further, with respect
to an estoppel, an estoppel does not create a new
cause of action, but merely protects the rights previously acquired, and further an estoppel does not
apply to work a gain to a party, but only to protect
from loss. An estoppel does not operate unless a
party has been induced to act to his injury.
The respondent submits the appellant cannot
recover under the Doctrine of Accord and Satisfaction because:
( 1) The Release tendered was in the amount
of $913.49 under the collision coverage (Exhibit
D-7),
( 2) The Release tendered was nevel' accepted
by the Third Party Plaintiff and Appellant,
( 3) The testimony of the Third Party Plaintiff and Appellant shows he never had any intention of accepting the Release tendered,
12

( 4) The Release was withdrawn before an
ceptance was made.

ac-

It is obvious from the evidence the lower court
was not compelled in any respect to find an Accord
and Satisfaction, and that further the evidence
would not have supported such a finding.
In Dillman vs. Massey Ferguson, Inc. ('196'2) 13
U. 2d 142, 369 P. 2d 296, where there was a dispute
as to whether the manufacturer breached it's contract by refusing to buy back items, and where
plaintiff accepted and cashed the manufacturer's
check after protesting the check did not take care
of all that was due plaintiff, the court affirmed
a judgment holding acceptance of the check was not
an Accord and Satisfaction.
In ,Riclvards and Sorenson vs. Lake Hills (1964)
15 U. 2d 150, 289 P. 2d 66, where trial court found
defendant offered plaintiff a non-interest bearing
debenture in the sum of $10,000.00 and where plaintiff returned it with a letter rejecting it, the ·court
sustained the trial court's finding tha:t no accord
was reached.
If acceptance of a check does not con~titµ,,t~
an accord, it would appear that for better reason, the
non-acceptance of a Release would also not constitute an accord.
···-~- · · ;:_ ._, ·
1

No coverage was afforded Mr. Joyner because
of Endorsement No. 1 excluded coverage for vehicles operated by a person under twenty.:.five. The
,.,
1 .:>

effect of Mr. Joyner's claim is to ask for a new
cause of action to be created where none existed
'
and further he wants a new cause of action created
where he gave no consideration for it.
As he had no right to make a claim when the
vehicle was being operated by someone under twentyfive other than Rosalie, he is asking for a gain by
way of estoppel and not for protection against a
'loss. This, of course, is not an estoppel anymore
than an accord, and as the evidence shows, Mr.
Joyner was not induced to repair the vehicle by
Mr. Kind, even if you assume repairing his own
vehicle is an injury, no estoppel existed. And, of
course, Mr. Joyner was benefited by Mr. Kershner's
repairs to the vehicle and not damaged. On the question of accord, the lower court found the evidence
in favor of the respondent and against the appellant,
and the evidence in that respect should be weighed
in the light most favorable to the respondent.
The only issue for the court to decide, in the
opinion of the respondent, is:
Was Endorsement No. 1 an effective bar to
the appellant's right to recover?
CONCLUSION
It is respectively submitted Endorsement No.

1 excluded all coverage to the appellant under any
coverage, and bars respondent from any liability to
the plaintiff in this action.
Respectfully submitted,
RAYMOND M. BERRY
Attorney for Third Party
Defendant and Respondent
1473South11th East
Salt Lake City, Utah

I hereby certify that on this ---------------- day of
____________________________ , 1965, I mailed two copies of this
Brief by United States mail, postage prepaid, to
Jackson B. Howiard for Howard & Lewis, Attorneys
for the Appellant, 120 East 3rd North, Provo, Utah.
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